Dosu post-mortem (Nov 2): the three checks it maps to
If you use Dosu: nothing, unless Dosu contacted you. Its Nov 8 post-mortem says it rotated every key and token it holds on your behalf, and "If you have not already been contacted directly, you don't need to take any action." It suggests searching your own logs for the indicators it lists.
If you build a multi-tenant app, the post-mortem is a free test plan. Dosu says the attacker "went from a new account to our cloud project in under two hours," and each step used one gap: an invitation policy that let anyone invite themselves into any org, an integration that sent its stored credentials to whatever server URL an owner typed in, and CI that gave pull requests production cloud credentials. Below, what Dosu says happened, then one test for each gap.
What Dosu says happened (Nov 2, UTC)
Dosu says the attacker used the ARTEX penetration testing framework, which "sent more than 80,000 requests in 90 minutes and found the flaw within hours," and that the flaw "wasn't detected in multiple penetration tests at various points in time, including one the week prior to the incident."
Oct 31 to Nov 2: scanning. From two IP addresses the attacker scanned Dosu's public APIs and tried forged tokens. "Every forged token was rejected."
05:59: a free account. They signed up with Slack sign-in.
06:21–07:00: org takeover. "An incorrect RLS policy check let the attacker create an invitation to any org." They invited themselves as owner of Dosu's internal org and of one open-source community org.
06:42: integration credentials. As owner, they "changed the server URL of our internal org's integrations to a Cloudflare Quick Tunnel they controlled. Dosu then sent those integrations' credentials to the tunnel," including a read-only database token and a GitHub token for Dosu's bot account.
06:51–07:57: the database. With that access they collected more database credentials, read tables and ran commands. At 07:27 they downloaded the list of user accounts.
07:50: CI. With the bot's GitHub token they opened a pull request. "Our CI ran an infrastructure preview on pull requests with access to production cloud credentials. The pull request's code sent those credentials to the attacker."
07:52–07:59: the cloud project. They deployed a small backdoor service; Dosu's org policy blocked every attempt to make it public.
08:17: detection. "Supabase, our database provider, detected the malicious activity and alerted us." The invitation fix shipped at 15:35 and every production secret was rotated by 16:53.
1. A brand-new account can't invite itself into someone else's org
Dosu's way in was "one missing check in one access policy." Read policies get tested; insert policies on invitation and membership tables often don't. Our note: the insert policy has to check that the inviter is already an admin of the org named in the new row, and that nobody can grant a role higher than their own.
Sign up a fresh account in your app, the way an attacker would. Copy its access token (supabase.auth.getSession()), then try to create an invitation, or a membership row directly, for an org that account doesn't belong to:
curl -s -w "\n%{http_code}\n" -X POST "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/invitations" \
-H "apikey: $SUPABASE_ANON_KEY" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $NEW_USER_JWT" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"org_id":"<an org you are not in>","role":"owner"}'
Pass: an RLS error ("new row violates row-level security policy"), not a 201. Repeat for the memberships table, for an update that changes role or org_id, and for any RPC that accepts invitations. Use your real table and column names.
Then read the policy itself. A sketch of the shape that passes, with your own names:
create policy "admins invite to their own org" on public.invitations
for insert to authenticated
with check (exists (
select 1 from public.memberships m
where m.org_id = invitations.org_id
and m.user_id = (select auth.uid())
and m.role in ('owner', 'admin')
));
2. Changing an integration's URL doesn't send it the stored secret
Dosu's integrations sent their credentials to whatever server URL the org owner set, so owning the org meant owning the credentials. Our note: the test is to change the endpoint and watch what arrives. Point the integration at a request bin you control and check whether the first request carries the old token. If it does, make a URL change clear the stored secret and require it to be entered again, and alert the org's other admins when it happens.
3. A pull request can't reach production credentials
Dosu's last hop was CI: a preview job ran pull-request code with production cloud credentials in reach. GitHub doesn't pass secrets (other than GITHUB_TOKEN) to workflows triggered from forks, but the attacker opened its pull request with the bot's own GitHub token, so the fork rule didn't apply.
List every workflow that runs on pull_request or pull_request_target and every secret it references (grep -rn "secrets\." .github/workflows). A production credential in any of them fails.
Move production credentials into a GitHub environment. GitHub: environment secrets "are only available to workflow jobs that use the environment," and only "after any configured rules (for example, required reviewers) pass." Restrict its deployment branches to your main branch.
Where your cloud supports it, replace stored cloud keys with OpenID Connect so CI gets short-lived credentials. Dosu: "deployments now use short-lived credentials instead of stored keys."
Want us to run it for you? The Ship Check Audit runs the two-account and cross-org tests against your app and lists every key that ever left your server: $149, within 48 hours.
If you use Dosu
Dosu lists as exposed: names, email addresses, sign-in providers and sign-in times for Dosu users (no passwords), and for some customers pages it had indexed; it contacted those customers. Not exposed, per Dosu: source code, messages, billing information, and integration credentials and API keys ("credentials are encrypted and API keys are hashed"). To check your own logs, Dosu's main attack address was 185.209.178.153 and scanning came from 56.10.188.158; the full indicator table is in the post-mortem. Our note: since your email address is on the downloaded list, expect phishing that mentions Dosu.
Not on Wiz's list
Dosu isn't one of the sixteen platforms in Wiz's "Black October" post (as of its Nov 10 edit). Dosu says the attacker's searches "repeatedly targeted strings in" OpenAI and Anthropic key formats, the same target Wiz describes. See Black October: every AI dev platform breach in one list.
Ship Check Kit · $29
Rather not run it by hand?
The Ship Check Kit has your coding agent run the first test as written: SC-RLS-03 flags insert policies without a real with check and runs the second-account probe, and SC-TEN-01 tries org A's records as org B's user through every path. SC-SEC-04 lists every outbound call and the fields it sends. The CI check above isn't one of the kit's 44 yet.